Database systems for real-time applications must satisfy timing constraints associated with transactions, in addition to maintaining data consistency. In addition to real-time requirements, security is usually required in many applications. Multilevel security requirements introduce a new dimension to transaction processing in real-time database systems. In this paper, we argue that due to the con icting goals of each requirement, trade-o s need to be made between security and timeliness. We rst de ne mutual information, a measure of the degree to which security is being satis ed by a system. A secure two-phase locking protocol is then described and a scheme is proposed to allow partial violations of security for improved timeliness. Analytical expressions for the mutual information of the resultant covert channel are derived and a feedback control scheme is proposed that does not allow the mutual information to exceed a speci ed upper bound. Results showing the e cacy of the scheme obtained through simulation experiments are also discussed.
Introduction
Database security is concerned with the ability of a database management system to enforce a security policy governing the disclosure, modi cation or destruction of information. Most secure database systems use an access control mechanism based on the Bell-LaPadula model 3]. This model is stated in terms of subjects and objects. An object is understood to be a data le, record or a eld within a record. A subject is an active process that requests access to objects. Every object is assigned a classi cation and every subject a clearance. Classi cations and clearances are collectively referred to as security classes (or levels) and they are partially ordered. The BellLaPadula model imposes the following restrictions on all data accesses: a) Simple Security Property: A subject is allowed read access to an object only if the former's clearance is identical to or higher (in the partial order) than the latter's classi cation.
b) The *-Property: A subject is allowed write access to an object only if the former's clearance is identical to or lower than the latter's classi cation.
The above two restrictions are intended to ensure that there is no ow of information from objects at a higher access class to subjects at a lower access class. Since the above restrictions are mandatory and enforced automatically, the system checks security classes of all reads and writes. Database systems that support the Bell-LaPadula properties are called multilevel secure database systems (MLS/DBMS).
The Bell-LaPadula model prevents direct ow of information from a higher access class to a lower access class, but the conditions are not su cient to ensure that security is not violated indirectly through what are known as covert channels 14] . A covert channel allows indirect transfer of information from a subject at a higher access class to a subject at a lower access class. In the context of concurrency control approaches, a covert channel arises when a resource or object in the database is shared between subjects with di erent access classes. The two subjects can cooperate with each other to transfer information. An important measure of the degree to which security is compromised by a covert channel is measured by the amount of information that may be transferred from a high-subject to a low-subject. This will be explained in greater detail in Section 3.
A real-time database management system (RTDBMS) is a transaction processing system where transactions have explicit timing constraints. Typically a timing constraint is expressed in the form of a deadline, a certain time in the future by which a transaction needs to be completed. In a real-time system, transactions must be scheduled and processed in such a way that they can be completed before their corresponding deadline expires. Conventional data models and databases are not adequate for time-critical applications. They are designed to provide good average performance, while possibly yielding unacceptable worst-case response times. As advances in multilevel security take place, MLS/DBMSs are also required to support real-time requirements. As more and more of such systems are in use, one cannot avoid the need for integrating real-time transaction processing techniques into MLS/DBMSs.
Concurrency control is used in databases to manage the concurrent execution of operations by di erent subjects on the same data object such that consistency is maintained. In multilevel secure databases, there is the additional problem of maintaining consistency without introducing covert channels. In this paper, we concern ourselves with concurrency control mechanisms that have to satisfy both security and real-time requirements. We advance our claim that con icts between these two requirements are inherent and hence trade-o s between them are necessary. A summary of related work in this area is included in Section 2. Some background information on correctness criteria for secure schedulers is covered in Section 3. In Section 4, the problems associated with time-constrained secure concurrency control are studied. In Section 5, the secure two phase locking protocol and 2PL-High Priority are discussed. A scheme that allows partial violations of security requirements is proposed in Section 6, and the mutual information of the resultant covert channel is derived. A feedback control mechanism that maintains the amount of mutual information of the system at a speci ed upper bound is described in Section 7. In Section 8, it is shown that the analysis and control of the single covert channel considered in Section 6 is enough to bound the mutual information of all covert channels that could be potentially exploited. An implementation and performance analysis of the feedback control mechanism is explained in Section 9. Section 10 concludes the paper.
Related Work
There have been several interesting approaches to analyzing and reducing the covert channel bandwidth 30, 11, 19, 9] . While some of these approaches could be used to specify policies to make it di cult to exploit the covert channels that may arise from the trade-o , others may not be applicable in real-time application. For example, a collection of techniques known as fuzzy time 30, 11] is inappropriate in a real-time setting, since the overall mission may be jeopardized by not getting the exact timing information. In fact, this problem between real-time and covert channel was identi ed in Secure Alpha work 10]. They have pointed out that slowing clocks or isolating processes from precise timing information is impractical for real-time systems. An adaptive solution to make appropriate trade-o s between the requirements of real-time and security is essential, and it requires resolution rules to specify the appropriate behavior. To be e ective, it is desirable that the rules be based on application-speci c knowledge 5]. Our resolution speci cation approach is similar to their idea of \Important Enough to Interfere" and signaling cost which consider the timeliness and levels between which a covert channel could be established.
The idea of using probabilistic partitioning in bus-contention covert channel is proposed in 9]. Instead of keeping track of the percentage of violations for making decisions when con icts occur, the system could enforce a certain pre-determined percentage by picking up a random number that generates 0 or 1, based on the required percentage. It needs further study to nd out whether this way of enforcing the requirements provides a reasonable level of exibility in specifying the requirements and reduced system overhead.
To improve the practicality and usability of the covert channel analysis in real systems, it might be necessary to provide methods to specify a higher-level goals regarding the potential trade-o s between real-time requirements and covert channel leaks. The user-centered security approach 31] which considers user needs as a primary design goal of secure system development could be useful to gure out a higher-level description of user needs and expectations on speci c situations. It could begin with some scenario-based requirement speci cation for the system to clearly identify the situation and necessary actions to take. The system may need to install monitors to check the system states and perform necessary adjustments by feedback control mechanisms to maintain the high-level goals speci ed by the user. Ideas similar to the dynamic adaptive security model proposed in 29] could be used to provide allowable trade-o s between security and real-time performance.
George and Haritsa studied the problem of supporting real-time and security requirements 7].
They examined real-time concurrency control protocols to identify the ones that can support the security requirement of non-interference. This work is fundamentally di erent from our work because they make the assumption that security must always be maintained. In their work, it is not permissible to allow a security violation in order to improve on real-time performance.
There have been several approaches to exploit the possible trade-o s between real-time and security requirements. In 20], a novel concurrency control protocol has been proposed to meet the real-time, security, and serializability requirements of applications. This protocol employs a primary and secondary copies for each object. While the transactions at higher levels refer to the secondary copy, the transactions at the same classi cation level as the object refer to the primary copy. Due to this scheme, a higher level transaction is never delayed due to a lower-level transaction. Similarly, a high-level transaction never interferes with a low-level transaction. In 27], an adaptive protocol was proposed with performance results which illustrate the clear bene t of using adaptive approach in secure real-time databases. In their approach, con icts are resolved based on two factors: the security factor which indicates the degree of security violations, and the deadline miss factor which indicates the timeliness of the system. Depending on the values of those factors, the system takes either secure option (no security violation) or insecure option (no priority inversions). In 21], a multiversion locking protocol was proposed to provide security and timeliness together, using multiple versions of data objects. The protocol provides 1-copy serializability and eliminates all the covert channels. The protocol ensures that high priority transactions are neither delayed nor aborted by low priority transactions. In 28], a set of exible security policies were proposed and evaluated, based on the notion of partial security, instead of absolute security. They proposed a speci cation method that enables the system designer to specify important properties of the database at an appropriate level. A tool can analyze the database speci cation to nd potential con icts, and to allow the designer to specify the rules to follow during execution when those con icts arise. Ahmed and Vrbsky also studied the trade-o s between security and real-time requirements, and proposed a secure optimistic concurrency control protocol 2].
Correctness Criteria for Secure Schedulers
Covert channel analysis and removal is one of the most important issues in multilevel secure concurrency control. The notion o f non-interference has been proposed 8] as a simple and intuitively satisfying de nition of what it means for a system to be secure. The property of non-interference states that the output as seen by a subject must be una ected by the inputs of another subject at a higher access class. This means that a subject at a lower access class should not be able to distinguish between the outputs from the system in response to an input sequence including actions from a higher level subject and an input sequence in which all inputs at a higher access class have been removed 13] . An extensive analysis of the possible covert channels in a secure concurrency control mechanism and the necessary and su cient conditions for a secure, interference-free scheduler are given in 13]. Three of these properties are of relevance to the secure two phase locking protocol discussed in this paper. Each property represents one way to prevent a covert channel in a secure system. Clearly, all three properties need to be enforced to completely eliminate the possibility of covert channels with secure two-phase concurrency control protocols.
For the following de nitions, given a schedule s and an access level l, purge(s; l) is the schedule with all actions at a level > l removed from s. 1) Value Security: A scheduler satis es this property if values read by a subject are not a ected by actions with higher subject classi cation levels. Stated formally, for an input schedule p, the output schedule s is said to be value secure if purge(s; l) is view equivalent 1 to the output schedule produced for purge(p; l).
2) Delay Security: This property ensures that the delay experienced by an action is not a ected by the actions of a subject at a higher classi cation level. Here, the delay is measured as the time between the arrival of the request for the execution of an action at the system to the time the action is completed. For an input schedule p and an output schedule s, a scheduler is delay secure if for all levels l in p, each of the actions a 1 in purge(p; l) is delayed in the output schedule produced for purge(p; l) if and only if it is delayed in purge(s; l).
3) Recovery Security: Due to con icting actions, transactions in a real-time database system may be involved in a deadlock. Recovery of the system from this state involves aborting one or more actions leading to the deadlock. The recovery security property ensures that the occurrence of a deadlock appears the same to a low-level subject, independent of whether higher level actions are in the schedule or not. The actions taken to recover from deadlock are also not a ected by the presence of higher level transactions. When a deadlock occurs, other channels are available for signaling in addition to those protected by value security and delay security. The following condition takes care of these channels 13]: A scheduler is recovery secure for all schedules p if, on the arrival of an action A X for scheduling: 1) If a deadlock occurs, resulting in a set of actions D being rolled back, then for all subject classi cation levels l in p, which dominate one of those in D, a deadlock also occurs in response to the schedule purge(p; l) on the arrival of the action A X , with the actions purge(D; l) being rolled back. In other words, the presence of the higher level actions did not interfere with the occurrence of deadlocks among lower level actions. 2) If no deadlock occurs on the arrival of A X , then for all subject classi cation levels l in p, it does not occur on the arrival of A X in the input schedule purge(p; l). In other words, if there were no deadlocks among actions at a lower level in the presence of higher level actions, then there would be none in their absence. This again emphasizes the non-interference of high-level actions with low-level actions.
Performance Penalty of Enforcing Security
In order to enforce security in database systems, we need to enforce the property of non-interference of high-level transactions with low-level transactions. For example, in a secure environment, a transaction at a higher level:
cannot cause a transaction at a lower access class to abort. If it is allowed to do so, it is possible that it can control the number of times a lower level transaction is aborted, thereby opening a covert channel.
cannot con ict with a transaction at a lower access class. If such a con ict does occur, the higher level transaction has to be blocked or aborted, not the low level transaction.
cannot be granted greater priority of execution over a transaction at a lower access class.
However, such enforcement has the unfortunate e ect of degrading performance for high-level transactions in a real-time system. For example, a typical real-time data base assigns priorities to transactions based on how close they are to missing their deadlines 1, 22, 24] . A high-level transaction with a closer deadline is assigned a higher-priority than a possibly con icting low-level transaction with farther deadlines. However, this may be interpreted as interference of the highlevel transaction the with the low-level transaction in a secure environment. In other words, if we were to enforce security and hence the non-interference properties described above, we need to assign higher priority to the low-level transaction and a lower priority to the high-level transaction. This may, however, result in missing of deadlines for the high-level transaction. In other words, the performance of high-level transactions is being penalized to enforce security.
To illustrate the penalty on high-level transactions due to security enforcement, let us consider the following example. A sequence of four transactions are input to a scheduler (the transactions arrived in the T 1 ; T 2 ; T 3 ; T 4 order):
w(x) T 4 (UNCLASSIFIED) :
r(x)
Assume that T 1 , T 2 , T 3 and T 4 have priorities 5, 7, 10 and 12 respectively and the priority assignment scheme is such that if priority(T 2 ) > priority(T 1 ), then T 2 is more critical and has to be scheduled ahead of T 1 . In the above example, T 2 and T 3 are initially blocked by T 1 when they arrive. When T 1 completes execution, T 3 is scheduled ahead of T 2 , since it has a greater priority than T 2 and the transaction execution order would be T 1 T 3 T 2 T 4 . However, if the transaction T 1 is removed, the execution order would be T 2 T 3 T 4 because T 2 would have been scheduled as soon as it had arrived. The presence of the SECRET transaction T 1 thus changes the value read by the UNCLASSIFIED transaction T 4 , which is a violation of value security. Delay security is also violated, since the presence of T 1 delays both T 2 and T 3 .
Therefore, to satisfy the correctness properties discussed in Section 3 (i.e., to close all covert channels), we see that very high performance penalty would be paid. In our approach to improving performance, we shall discuss a method to trade-o mutual information transfer allowed by a covert channel with performance (measured in terms of deadline miss percentage).
Secure Two Phase Locking
Before a discussion and analysis of covert channels, let us study two concurrency control approaches at di erent ends of the spectrum|Secure 2PL, a fully secure protocol which does not consider transaction priorities while scheduling and 2PL-HP, which has some deadline cognizance built into it, but is not free from covert channels.
Secure 2PL
Basic two-phase locking does not work for secure databases because a transaction at a lower access class (say T l ) cannot be blocked due to a con icting lock held by a transaction at a higher access class (T h ). If T l were somehow allowed to continue with its execution in spite of the con ict, then noninterference would be satis ed. The basic principle behind the secure two-phase locking protocol is to try to simulate execution of Basic 2PL without blocking the lower access class transactions by higher access class transactions.
Consider the two transactions in the following example (Example 1):
Basic two phase locking would fail because w 2 x] would be blocked waiting for T 1 to commit and release read-lock on x (i.e., ru 1 x]). In our modi cation to the two phase locking protocol, T 2 is allowed to set a virtual lock vwl 2 x], write onto a version of x local to T 2 and continue with the execution of its next operation, i.e., c 2 . When T 1 commits and releases the lock on x, T 2 's virtual write lock is upgraded to a real lock and w 2 x] is performed. Until w 2 x] is performed, no con icting action is allowed to set a lock on x. The sequence of operations performed are therefore, rl 1 is not being achieved. On closer inspection, it is obvious that this problem arises because w 2 y] is allowed to proceed with its execution even though w 2 x] could only write onto a local version of x due to the read lock rl 1 x] set by T 1 . To avoid this problem, for each transaction T i , two lists are maintained | before(T i ) which is the list of active transactions that precede T i in the serialization order and after(T i ) which is the list of active transactions that follow T i in the serialization order.
This idea is adapted from 24], where before cnt and after cnt are used to dynamically adjust the serialization order of transactions. The following additions are made to the basic two phase locking protocol:
1) When an action p i x] sets a virtual lock on x because of a real lock ql j x] held by T j , then T i and all transactions in after(T i ) are added to after(T j ), and T j and all transactions in before(T j ) are added to before(T i ).
2) When an action w i x] arrives and nds that a previous action w i y] (for some data item y) has already set a virtual write lock vwl i y], then a dependent lock dvwl i x] is set with respect to vwl i y]. 3) When an action p i x] arrives and nds that a con icting virtual or dependent lock vql j x] or dvql j x] has been set by a transaction T j which is in after(T i ), then p i x] is allowed to set a lock on x and perform p i x] in spite of the con icting lock. 4) A dependent virtual lock dvp i x], dependent on some action q i y], is upgraded to a virtual lock when vql i x] is upgraded to a real lock.
The maintenance of a serialization order and the presence of dependent locks are necessary to prevent uncontrolled acquisition of virtual locks by transactions at lower access classes.
For example 2, the sequence of operations that would now be performed are rl 1 A formal description of the Secure 2PL algorithm and its correctness proofs are given in 6].
2PL -High Priority
In 2PL-HP 1], all data con icts are resolved in favor of the transaction with higher priority. When a transaction requests a lock on an object held by other transactions in a con icting mode, if the requester's priority is higher than that of all lock holders, the holders are restarted and the requester is granted the lock; if the requester's priority is lower, it waits for the lock holders to release the lock. In addition, a new read lock requester can join a group of read lock holders only if its priority is higher than that of all waiting write lock operations.
A real-time secure concurrency control must possess two characteristics -high performance and minimal deadline miss percentage. The secure two phase locking protocol 6] was shown to yield best average case performance among all the secure concurrency control approaches whose performance was evaluated in 26]. We therefore use it as a basis for our approach to the problem of realtime secure concurrency control. From our discussion earlier in this paper, it is clear that priority based transaction scheduling is not feasible for a fully secure database system. Therefore, for minimizing deadline miss percentage, we take the approach that partial security violations under certain conditions are permissible, if it results in substantial gain in time cognizance.
6 Covert Channel Analysis
Covert Channels and Mutual Information
The systematic study of covert channels began with 14]. As an example of a simple covert channel consider two processes running on a system that schedules them alternately for exactly one or two time quanta each, the choice being up to the process 16]. One process (the sender) may send information covertly to the other (receiver) by encoding successive symbols (0's and 1's in this paper) in the amount of time taken for its execution. If the receiver had to wait for one quantum before its execution, then it assumes a \0" was sent; if it waits for two quanta, it assumes a \1" was sent. In the absence of any other processes, the maximum rate at which information can be transmitted through this channel is one bit per quantum (assuming only 0's are transmitted). Assuming that 0's and 1's are transmitted with equal frequency the information rate is 1/((0.5)(1) + (0.5(2)), or 2/3 bits per quanta. The presence of other processes in the system interferes with the transmission and can be viewed as \noise". The presence of noise decreases the information rate.
Covert channel analysis is just a subset of information theory, which is concerned with sending signals from a transmitter to a receiver, with the possibility of noise degrading the signal delity. Shannon's pioneering work 23] gives an upper limit on the rate at which messages can be passed through the communication channel based solely on how noise a ects the transmission of signals.
In popular usage, the term \information" is elusive to de ne. However, information has a precise meaning to a communication theorist, expressed solely in terms of probabilities of source messages and actions of the channel. A precise measurement of information is based on various entropy (or uncertainty) measures associated with the communication process and information exchange is de ned by reduction in entropy.
Consider a discrete scalar random variable X, which can be regarded as an output of a discrete message source. Suppose the variable X can assume one of K possible outcomes, labeled x i ; i = 0; 1; : : : K ? 1, with probabilities speci ed by P i . The entropy of the random variable X is
The entropy measures the \information" or \surprise" of the di erent values of X. For a particular value x i the surprise is log(1=P i ); if x i happens with certainty then its surprise is zero, and if x i never occurs its surprise is maximal at in nity. Note that base two logarithm is used so that the units of information is in bits.
Information theory is concerned with how the input or transmission entropy changes while it travels through the channel. If the channel is noiseless then the amount of information in a transmission should be unchanged. If there is noise in the channel, then the delity of the signal is degraded and the information sent is diminished. If the channel noise is so great and all encompassing, then there is no more surprise in seeing any symbol over another. This is mathematically P(x i )
Using the de nition of conditional probability,
When transmitting, the transmitter can do nothing about the noise, and the receiver is passive and waits for symbols to be passed over the channel. However, the transmitter can send di erent symbols with di erent frequencies; thus there are di erent distributions for X. By changing the frequency of the symbols sent, the transmitter can a ect the amount of information sent to the receiver.
There is a critical di erence between covert channels and communication channels, though. The goal of a communication channel designer is to maximize mutual information and minimize the in uence of noise. When covert channels exist, the goal of the system designer is exactly the opposite|to try to minimize the mutual information, usually by increasing noise.
A Noisy Covert Channel
In any system where a locking mechanism is used for synchronization of concurrently executing transactions, whenever a transaction T 1 requests a lock on a data item x on which another transaction T 2 holds a con icting lock, there are two possible options: -T 1 could be blocked until T 2 releases the lock. -T 2 could be aborted and the lock granted to T 1 .
The latter option is a \non-secure" option that is taken by 2PL-HP when T 1 has a higher priority than T 2 . The former option, along with the additional conditions and actions described in Section 5.1, would be the \secure" option if T 1 were at a higher security level than T 2 . However, this option does not take into account the priorities of T 1 and T 2 . In our approach, we try to strike a balance between these two options. Consider a Bernoulli random variable X with parameter q (i.e., X takes value 1 with probability q and a 0 with probability 1 ? q). Now, whenever a con ict arises between a lock holding transaction (T 2 ) and a lock requesting transaction (T 1 ), such that priority(T 1 ) > priority(T 2 ), T 2 is aborted if X = 1. Since P(X = 1) = q, T 2 is aborted with a probability q (the \non-secure" option is taken). If X = 0, then the \secure" option is taken. Note that q can be used to control the extent to which security is satis ed. Lesser the value of q, greater the extent to which security is satis ed and therefore greater the miss percentage.
Unfortunately, this approach is not free from covert channels. Consider two collaborating transactions, one at security level LOW and the other at security level HIGH, each consisting of just one operation. Assume that at the start of a time interval of duration t (henceforth referred to as a tick), the LOW transaction submits a write on a data item x and shortly thereafter (within the tick), the HIGH transaction submits a read on x. Also assume that the transactions collaborate to ensure that the HIGH transaction has an earlier deadline than the LOW transaction. Now, in the absence of other transactions and if q were 1, then the LOW transaction would certainly be aborted due to the HIGH transaction. If the HIGH transaction were not submitted, then the LOW transaction would commit. Therefore it takes just one tick for the HIGH transaction to transmit either a \1" (by submitting its operation) or a \0" (by not submitting its operation). In this case, the mutual information of the channel is 1 bit/tick. There are, however, two factors which introduce noise into this channel | rstly, the presence of other transactions and secondly, the probability q of the lock holding transaction being aborted.
The rst factor is modeled by a set of parameters: r (Table 1 ) and p 1 through p 6 ( Table 2) . 1 ? r is the probability that a transaction T i (other than T 1 and T 2 ) with an earlier deadline than the LOW transaction submits a read or a write on x before the end of execution of the LOW transaction, i.e., the aborting of the LOW transaction may be caused by either HIGH transaction or T i . The probabilities p 1 through p 6 represent the arrival time of T i (shown as S i ) with respect to the LOW and HIGH transactions. These are summarized in Table 2 . For example, p 1 is the probability that T i does not arrive within L units of arrival of LOW transaction (or T L ). In other words, if the HIGH transaction (T H ) has not been submitted, then with p 1 probability, T L would be committed and \0" conveyed to the LOW user. Similarly, p 2 is the probability with which T i arrives after T L 's arrival but within the lock holding time ( L ) of T L . Since a transaction is often delayed due to other operating system overheads such as interrupt handling, we have introduced a time-out factor for the transactions. For example, if the LOW user does not get a response (abort or commit of T L ) within L units of the initiation of T L , it is automatically aborted by an explicit operation from the LOW user. Such instances are considered as ERROR by that user. In the next sub-section, we shall derive an equation for mutual information in terms of these factors.
An important assumption has to be stated at this point regarding the extent of knowledge that a HIGH user has. We assume that a HIGH user has information only about the transactions that it and its collaborators submit, i.e., all system-maintained information such as current arrival rate of transactions, the deadlines of other transactions in the system, locks held by other transactions, etc., is at a SUPER-HIGH level and inaccessible to HIGH users. This assumption is not unfair because the concurrency control manager is trusted and therefore, should not leak out information that could be used by a malicious user. This assumption is important because if a malicious HIGH user has access to system information, it has control over q. If it knows which transactions could possibly interfere with its transmission of a \1" to the LOW user, it can then get rid of those transactions as follows: At the start of a tick, the HIGH user rst nds a set of active transactions that have an earlier deadline than the collaborating LOW level transaction and a data item on which each transaction holds a lock. This can be represented as a set of tuples f T 1 ; x 1 ]; T 2 ; x 2 ]; : : : ; T n ; x n ]g.
It then submits transactions with a lesser deadline that access each of these data items, thereby causing the abortion of all the transactions in the set. This does not eliminate the e ect of q on the channel, but reduces its value.
Analysis of Mutual Information
To derive an expression for mutual information of the covert channel, we make the following assumptions:
The LOW user submits transaction T L periodically. T L has a period of , computation time requirement of L , and a priority of P L . T L requires a write-lock on a data object x at the beginning of execution. The lock is released only at the end of its execution.
The HIGH user also has a periodic behavior (with periodicity ). Whenever it intends to send \1" via the covert channel to the LOW user, it submits transaction T H ; it does not submit T H in a period when it intends to send \0". In other words, the time interval between successive arrivals of T H is an integral multiple of . The arrivals of T L and T H are out of phase (or phase-shifted) in the sense that, the arrival of T H always takes place at exactly units from the last arrival of T L . Since the information is conveyed through the abort/commit of T L , L > . In other words, T L should hold the lock on x long enough that it is aborted when the high priority T H requests for a readlock on x. Priority of T i q Prob. of aborting a low-priority transaction when a con icting data lock request is made by a high-priority transaction r Prob. of P i < P L Prob. that \0" is sent by HIGH user Table 2 : Probabilities related to T i 's lock request and release times As discussed above, T i represents other transactions (besides T L and T H ) that may have conicting data access requirements with T L on x. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that at most one such T i exists to interfere with the covert operations of T H and T L through the data access of object x.
Let us assume that the low user has submitted T L at time t. More precisely, the instance of T L under consideration has arrived and requested for a write-lock on x at time t. The nal outcome of T L will depend on the behavior of T H as well as T i . We present the analysis in terms of the two cases: HIGH user sends \0" and HIGH user send \1". All the subcases, the outcomes, and the corresponding probabilities are summarized in Table 3 .
From these probabilities, we now derive the following factors for covert channel analysis. Here, x i refers to the event when the input x = i. Figure 1 . In addition, the other parameters are chosen such that it is possible to exchange maximum mutual information through the covert channel. Accordingly, p 1 = p 3 = p 4 = 0:0, p 2 = 1:0 and p 5 = p 6 = 0:5. It may be observed that the mutual information is the highest when there is least intervention from the other transactions or r = 1:0. Similarly, the mutual information reaches the upper bound of 1.0 when the probability of sending \0" or \1" is equal (i.e., = 0:5).
The impact of the arrival of other transactions on I is further illustrated in Figure 2 where di erent values of p i 's are chosen. Once again, to maximize I, it is assumed that an arriving high priority transaction always aborts a low priority holder. Further, the impact of the \High aborting Low" is illustrated in Figure 3 where q = 0:5 or a low priority is aborted by a high priority transaction only with probability 0.5. Clearly, the mutual information is smaller in this case.
Assuming that there is no interference from other transactions (i.e., r=1.0), the e ect of q on I is illustrated in Figure 4 . Since there is no interference, the p i s are irrelevant. It may be observed that the mutual information increases with the value of q.
Finally, a plot of the I versus both q and r with = 0:5 and some chosen values of p i s is displayed in Figure 5 . The results support our intuitive understanding of the e ect of the system parameters on the mutual information transferred through the covert channel.
A Secure Real-Time Concurrency Control Mechanism
From the above discussion, it is clear that the mutual information of a covert channel is determined by the parameters p 1 through p 6 , q, and r. Clearly, q is a parameter that is completely under the control of our system. The parameter r, however, depends on the characteristic of other transactions in the system. Obviously, r varies with system load and the relative priority of other transactions with respect to the LOW transaction. Larger values of r implies higher interference for the LOW and HIGH users, and hence lower transfer of mutual information through the covert channel. Thus, to reduce the mutual information, r can be arbitrarily increased by introducing \fake" transactions which do not change the state of the database, but which access data items randomly. This is not a desirable option, since these transactions compete for resources and data items that would otherwise be allocated to normal transactions, thereby degrading the performance.
The parameters p 1 through p 6 are in uenced by the start and nish times of other transactions that are active during T L . In addition, they are in uenced by L , L , and of the LOW user transaction. In particular, smaller time-out periods ( L ? L ) for T L imply higher value of p 4 and hence a higher probability for the LOW-user to receive the error symbol \e". On the other hand, higher values of time-out imply larger value of p 3 and smaller value of p 4 resulting in larger value of P(x 1 ; y 0 )|probability that T L is committed even when T H is submitted.
Therefore, we shall assume that r is a parameter that cannot be controlled; however, the average value of r can be estimated by the scheduler for each level of transactions, periodically. The parameters p 1 through p 6 are even more di cult to estimate since they depend on the parameters dictated by the LOW and HIGH user, and hence are not known to the scheduler (or any other trusted component of the system). For this reason, it is best to make a conservative estimate of these parameters resulting in maximal mutual information for the covert channel. Finally, it is q that is under the control of the scheduler and can be tuned according to the allowable I. Given r and the allowable value for I, the system can adjust the value of q.
The two transactions involved in the covert channel can collaborate to reduce the duration of a tick, thereby reducing r. However, there is a certain lower bound, below which the duration cannot be reduced. This is because there are three steps involved in the transmission of a symbol (\0" or \1"):
-at the start of a tick, the LOW transaction submits its write operation.
-if the HIGH user wishes to transmit a \1", it submits its read operation.
-the system has to send a \TRANSACTION ABORTED" message to the LOW user.
Or alternately, -at the start of a tick, the LOW transaction submits its write operation.
-if the HIGH user wishes to transmit a \0", no operation is submitted; otherwise it submits a read operation.
-the system sends either a \TRANSACTION COMMITTED" or a \TRANSACTION ABORTED" message depending on the interference and its decision to abort/not-abort a low-priority transaction for a high-priority transaction.
For the covert channel to be e ective, the duration of a tick cannot be lower than the overhead involved in performing these three operations in the worst case.
There are two requirements on a secure real-time concurrency control mechanism|a security requirement, expressed as an upper bound on mutual information and a real-time requirement, expressed as an upper bound on miss percentage. Given I and values for r and p 1 through p 6 (recall that the value of r is estimated and p 1 through p 6 are computed based on conservative assumptions) q can be calculated from the equation derived for mutual information in the previous section. It is very di cult to derive a closed form solution for q in terms of r, I, and p 1 through p 6 . But a simple iterative solution for q can be obtained easily using the Newton-Raphson method. While there is no direct mathematical relationship between the deadline miss percentage and these parameters, simulation studies 26] indicate that with increasing arrival rate (and therefore increasing r), the deadline miss percentage increases slowly but steadily up to a certain point, after which the system becomes unstable. Similarly, with increasing q (from 0 to 1), the deadline miss percentage rst increases (up to a value of r in the range 0.3 to 0.4) and then decreases continuously until q = 1.
Our approach to a real-time secure concurrency control mechanism uses a feedback control mechanism to ensure that the mutual information at any given time does not exceed the upper bound speci ed. The approach is described by the following pseudo-code: This approach provides guarantees only on the mutual information allowed by the resulting channel, not on the deadline miss percentage. If the miss percentage increases above the desired miss percentage speci ed, there is nothing that the system can do. The only thing that can be done is to report to DBA as in step 4. The DBA can then either increase the upper bound on I, thereby increasing q and in turn decreasing the miss percentage, or can relax the miss percentage requirement and increase the value of the desired miss percentage.
If the deadline miss percentage requirement is being comfortably met by the system, then a drop in miss percentage can be a orded. This is what is done in step 5, where the covert channel is e ectively closed by setting q to 0. When the miss percentage again increases and approaches the desired miss percentage value, normal operation is resumed and the value of q is calculated from I and the current value of r and p 1 through p 6 .
Discussion
The amount of mutual information transferred through a covert channel varies inversely with the degree of randomness in the system. In the scheme that we have discussed, there is not much randomness, since we strive to maintain the mutual information at a speci ed value. One can therefore argue that since the amount of mutual information allowed is maintained more or less constant, a malicious subject can utilize this channel|albeit at a much lower delity|to transmit information. A certain degree of randomness can be introduced by the following procedure: the value of q is calculated from the desired value of I and the current value of r. Instead of using the value of q thus calculated, the value of q is sampled (for example) from a uniform distribution between q ? ; q + ]. The greater the value of , the greater the uncertainty in the resulting value of I. This might mean that sometimes the mutual information might increase beyond the upper bound speci ed, but due to the uncertainty it is very di cult for a user to exploit this channel.
All the derivations and methods to control I explained in this paper have been for the type of the covert channel discussed in Section 6.2. Are there other covert channels that malicious users can exploit and whose allowed mutual information would not be controlled by the feedback monitoring method explained earlier in the previous section? Let us investigate this issue further. From the correctness criteria for secure schedulers, covert channels can be broadly classi ed into three categories | those that communicate information through a violation of delay security, those that violate recovery security and those that violate value security. In 6], it is proved that Secure 2PL satis es delay security. Our real-time secure concurrency control mechanism explained in Section 7 is based on the Secure 2PL protocol. The approach di ers from Secure 2PL only when there is a con ict between a lock holding transaction T 1 and a lock requesting transaction T 2 and priority(T 2 ) > priority(T 1 ). In this case, T 1 is aborted and T 2 granted the lock, i.e., no transaction is being blocked. Therefore, delay security is not violated at any point. The covert channel studied in Section 6.2 is a canonical example of a channel that exploits a violation of recovery security. There might be other, more complicated, channels that could involve more than two transactions, but the parameters on which the mutual information that they could exchange would be dependent on a superset of q and r. A covert channel involving four collaborating transactions | one at HIGH and the rest at LOW | that exploits a violation in value security can work as follows:
At the start of a tick, a LOW transaction T 1 submits a write on a data item x (w 1 x]). A second LOW transaction T 2 then submits a write on x (w 2 x]). If the HIGH transaction T 3 wants to transmit a \1," it submits a read on x, such that deadline(T 1 ) < deadline(T 3 ) < deadline(T 2 ). As a result, T 2 is aborted. The \receiving" LOW transaction T 4 then submits a read on x. If it reads the value written by T 1 , then a \1"is received and if it reads the value written by T 2 , a \0" is received.
This covert channel too is dependent on two factors | the probability that a transaction T 4 would cause the aborting of T 2 before T 3 arrives and a probability q that T 2 would actually be aborted when T 3 submits its operation. In addition, there is also the possibility that T 1 could be aborted before T 4 submits its read, introducing an additional \noise" factor. As a result, the mutual information allowed by this channel would actually be less than that of the simple channel studied in Section 6.2.
Summarizing, we nd that simpler the covert channel, the lesser the number of factors that the mutual information of the channel is dependent on and therefore greater is its I. The covert channel studied in Section 6.2 is the simplest possible channel that can be exploited, given the correctness properties that are violated and therefore bounding its I is enough to bound the mutual information of more complicated covert channels that could be exploited.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of our performance study of the feedback control mechanism for a range of transaction arrival rates. The goal of the analysis is to show the variation in miss percentage for varying amounts of mutual information transferred through the covert channel.
Simulation Model
Central to the simulation model is a single-site disk resident database system operating on sharedmemory multiprocessors 15]. The system consists of a disk-based database and a main memory cache. The unit of database granularity is the page. When a transaction needs to perform an operation on a data item it accesses a page. If the page is not found in the cache, it is read from disk. CPU or disk access is through an M/M/k queueing system, consisting of a single queue with k servers (where k is the number of disks or CPUs). The amounts of CPU and disk I/O times are speci ed as model parameters in Table 4 . Since we are concerned only with providing security at the concurrency control level, the issue of providing security at the operating system or resource scheduling layer is not considered in this paper. That is the reason why we do not consider a secure CPU/disk scheduling approach. Our assumption is that the lower layers provide the higher concurrency control layer with a fair resource scheduling policy. The feedback approach is implemented as a layer over Secure 2PL. In the model, the execution of a transaction consists of multiple instances of alternating data access requests and data operation steps, until all the data operations in it complete or it is aborted. When a transaction makes a data request, i.e., lock request on a data object, the request must go through concurrency control to obtain a lock on the data object. If the transaction's priority is greater than all of the lock holders, and its lock request con icts with that of the holders, then the holders are aborted and the transaction is granted a lock with a probability q else the steps taken by the Secure 2PL protocol are followed; if the transaction's priority is lower, it waits for the lock holders to release the lock 1]. The probability q depends on the factors I and r. I is available directly, but r is calculated based on the arrival rate of transactions, the probability of contention, and their deadlines. The analysis is based on preemptive priority queueing policy with restart. The details of the analysis can be found in 6] .
If the request for a lock is granted, the transaction proceeds to perform the data operation, which consists of a possible disk access (if the data item is not present in the cache) followed by CPU computation. However, if only a virtual or dependent lock is granted, the transaction only does CPU computation, since the operation should only be performed on a local version. If the request for the lock is denied (the transaction is blocked), the transaction is placed into the data queue. When the waiting transaction is granted a lock, only then can it perform its data operation. Also, when a virtual lock for an operation is upgraded to a real lock, the data operation requires disk access and CPU computation. At any stage, if a deadlock is detected, the transaction to be aborted to break the deadlock is determined, aborted and restarted. When all the operations in a transaction are completed, the transaction commits. Even if a transaction misses its deadline, it is allowed to execute until all its actions are completed. Table 4 gives the names and meanings of the parameters that control system resources. The parameters, CPUTime and DiskTime capture the CPU and disk processing times per data page. Our simulation system does not explicitly account for the time needed for data operation scheduling. We assume that these costs are included in CPUTime on a per data object basis. The use of a database cache is simulated using probability. When a transaction attempts to read a data page, the system determines whether the page is in cache or disk using the probability BufProb. If the page is determined to be in cache, the transaction can continue processing without disk access. Otherwise disk access is needed. Transactions arrive in a Poisson stream, i.e., their inter-arrival rates are exponentially distributed. The ArriRate parameter speci es the mean rate of transaction arrivals. The number of data objects accessed by a transaction is determined by a normal distribution with mean TranSize, and the actual data objects to be accessed are determined uniformly from the database. The assignment of deadlines to transactions is controlled by the parameters MinSlack and MaxSlack, which set a lower and upper bound, respectively, on a transaction's slack time. We use the formula for deadline-assignment to a transaction. Deadline = AT + Uniform(MinSlack; MaxSlack) ET AT and ET denote the arrival time and execution time, respectively. The execution time of a transaction used in this formula is not an actual execution time, but a time estimated using the values of parameters TranSize, CPUTime and DiskTime. The priorities of transactions are decided by the Earliest Deadline First policy.
Parameters and Performance Metrics
The performance metric used is miss percentage, which is the ratio of the number of transactions that do not meet their deadline to the total number of transactions committed.
Experimental Results
An event-based simulation framework was written in`C'. For each experiment, we ran the simulation with the same parameters for 6 di erent random number seeds. Each simulation run was continued until 200 transactions at each access class were committed. For each run, the statistics gathered during the rst few seconds were discarded in order to let the system stabilize after an initial transient condition. For each experiment the required performance metric was measured over a wide range of workload. All the data reported in this paper have 90% con dence intervals, whose endpoints are within 10% of the point estimate.
In the experiment, the miss percentages for the feedback approach are measured for two di erent arrival rates. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 6 . Since we are considering a real-time database system, we restrict attention to the portion of the graph where miss percentages are less than 10%. The performance after the saturation point is not an issue. We also do not consider the section of the graph for I less than 0.1. At such low values of I, the value of q is also very low, which means that the behavior of the system is near identical to the Secure 2PL. Only for higher values of I is a certain degree of deadline cognizance introduced and that is the portion of the graph that we need to concentrate on. At low arrival rates, the dependence of miss percentage on I is minimal. This is because very few transactions miss their deadline even at low values of I and further increase in I does not appreciably decrease it either. At high arrival rates, however, the miss percentage rate is quite sensitive to changes in I. As is to be expected, for lower values of I, the miss percentage is the highest. This is obviously because of a low value of q, which signi es that very few transactions are being aborted to give greater priority to transactions with an earlier deadline. As the value of I increases, the value of q increases and the behavior of the system approaches that of 2PL-HP, resulting in decreased miss-percentage. 10 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored a possible direction for research in scheduling transactions to meet their timing constraints in a secure database. A possible way in which security could be partially compromised for improved miss percentage was explained and an expression for the mutual information (I) of the resultant covert channel derived. A feedback control system was then developed, which ensured that the mutual information transferred through the covert channel did not exceed a desired upper bound. Although no guarantees can be provided by the system on the deadline miss percentage, a facility is provided for renegotiating on the desired deadline miss percentage and the desired amount of mutual information when the desired miss percentage is exceeded.
The importance of real-time database systems in an increasing number of applications, such as those used in the military or the ones used in national infrastructure such as electric power and telecommunications is growing. These applications obviously need to support both security and real-time requirements. For example, when an accident or a failure is detected and considered severe, or physical or electronic attack is under way, the system must switch into crisis mode so that critical transactions can be executed by the deadline and essential data can be maintained. In such situations, it would be much more desirable to allow minor security violations to satisfy critical timing constraints.
There are a number of issues for future work. In the derivation of the mutual information of the covert channel, we have concentrated mainly on the dependence of I on parameter q. The dependence of I on the presence of other transactions in the system was conveniently abstracted away into a single parameter q. Although an approximate method for the estimation of q was used in the performance analysis, a precise calculation of q has not been considered. A formal queueing model of the system, based on the arrival rate of transactions, a calculation of lock con ict probabilities, blocking time, etc., is important not only for determining q, but could also help in establishing a probabilistic relationship between miss percentage and q and r. This could eliminate the need for raising an ERROR condition when the desired miss percentage is exceeded, since the correct setting of r can be obtained mathematically from I and desired miss percentage. Secondly, in 18] the use of I as a measure of security is questioned. Examples of zero mutual information channels are provided, where short messages can be sent through without any errors (or loss in delity). A small message criterion (SMC) is introduced, which is an indication of what will be tolerated by the system in terms of covertly leaking a short covert message of length n (\0"s and \1"s) in time t and with delity of transmission r%. Further work is needed to design a formal criterion that captures all these factors and has the same mathematical elegance as mutual information.
